The Long Game

So we've all woken up to what, instinctively, feels like a worst-case scenario. 

But here are some positives: 

7 million people voted for radical economic change. 7 million people were mobilised without a serious institutional machine pushing them into the polling stations. The Brotherhood have impressed with their continued ability to mobilise and it seems clear that the combined 1.3 million people employed by the Army and the Security Services have been encouraged to vote for Shafiq. 

13 million people don't see religion as the cure for political problems. 

Turnout was down at around 40% from 54% for the parliamentary elections. That's a whole lot of people that, in just 6 months, realised that parliamentary politics is not going to be what delivers the change they need. 

It feels like a loss that Sabahi and Abouel Fotouh were unable to combine. But it wasn't a total disaster. Had they been able to form a coalition yes, they would have won. And political space would have really opened up. But maybe the chance for a really radical change would have passed. 

Elections are deeply flawed and party politics is never able to deliver real change. Nor is it meant to. At least now we don't have the illusion of a messiah to grapple with. 

If Shafiq wins he will, as SCAF's puppet be unable to run the country. Much as SCAF themselves have found themselves unable to. And, unlike Mubarak, who projected an image of strength and built a personality cult around himself - Shafiq has neither the gravitas nor the time to carry the inevitable anger of nation alone. When people next erupt the apparatus behind and around him will be in the firing line. 

Meanwhile, he will be crippled by an uncooperative parliament and the Army and Brotherhood will be unable to find a way to work together. 

Likewise with Morsi as President. If they control both Parliament and the Presidency the Brotherhood will be in a serious position to challenge the Army's grip over the country's resources and economy. We will have four years of fight between them and, though the Brotherhood won't be able to deal a fatal blow, will seriously loosen the Army's grip. 

Meanwhile, in both these scenarios the Revolution lies in the hands of the Revolutionaries. The Revolution's job is to pressure the fault lines between those in power, to maintain the core narrative of the Aims of the Revolution ('bread, freedom, social justice'. [Note, it's 'freedom', not 'democracy']) and to provide alternatives. The Revolution has provided countless alternative governance structures on smaller, local scales - some with earth-shaking consequences (Tahrir Sq) - but the challenge is continuing to build ideas that can one day be applied on a national or regional level. 

The problem at that point, of course, lies in the idea of the nation state. But let's deal with that later…

In short, as long as we are willing to work we have lots to be grateful for. In America you get two choices. And they're both religio-miltaristic warmongers. Same in the UK. In Egypt, at least the guns and the prayers are still separated for now. And, given the history the Army and the MB have, are unlikely to combine anytime soon. Eventually, they will turn on each other. But first, they'll want to crush the revolution. 

The coming months are dangerous. The coming days are depressing. But let's remember the long game. We don't want a charming president and a functional parliament. We want to change the world.